(1) Fellow of Maastricht University, Fellow of the Royal Asiatic Society and of the British Institute of International and Comparative Law, Vice President EU-China Economic Cooperation and Development Council (ECECDC), Trade Adviser FIPRA Public Affairs. Former Director European Commission and Head of the EU Delegation to the WTO and UN, Geneva.
This article is based on a presentation given to the Morocco Tomato Conference, Agadir 21 May 2026
Introduction
This article examines the prospects for Morocco’s agricultural trade with the EU in the coming years. It assesses the EU’s recent trade performance and whether the EU will remain an open and attractive market for Moroccan produce. It suggests that the next European Common Agricultural Policy will not carry direct negative implications for Moroccan trade but that the broader trade policy and regulatory environment in Europe will prove increasingly challenging. The article concludes with a series of recommendations to the Moroccan government and its agricultural sector with a view to maximising Morocco’s access and continued presence on the EU market
EU Agrifood Trade : A Success Story
To understand the challenges and opportunities for future Morocco-EU agricultural trade one needs to understand first Europe’s recent trade performance, the drivers of it, and future prospects, all or which impact Morocco - given its enormous dependence on the EU market.
It is not generally recognised that the EU has been the world’s biggest exporter of agrifood products for the last decade and more, overtaking the US in 2011. In 2025 the EU exported over EUR 250 billion of products, against an import bill of EUR190 billion, leaving a sizeable surplus of around EUR 60 billion. The departure of the UK from the EU and hence from its trade figures resulted in the EU, since Brexit, moving from being the world’s biggest importer to the third importer.
The EU is also impressively diverse in terms of its export competitiveness. Contrary to popular belief it does not only export Champagne and Parmiggiano Reggiano cheese, but the whole gamut of products from commodities like wheat and pork to highly processed products like infant formula or chocolates. Wheat, followed by wines and spirits, and then dairy products, are the EU’s biggest exports in value terms. The region has a very resilient export basket. And it is more diversified in terms of markets than any other major agricultural region: the EU exports more than EUR 1 billion a year to 24 different markets.
The Drivers of European Agricultural Trade
What are the drivers of this impressive long term trade performance?
There are five.
First, the EU’s temperate climate has resulted in relatively benign agri-environmental conditions historically speaking.
Two, population growth around the world, notably outside Europe, has increased demand for food. Wheat to North Africa and milk powder to China are just two of dozens of possible examples.
Three, growing urbanisation and the rise of middle class consumers in many parts of the world, above all in E Asia, but even now in Sub Saharan Africa, is increasing demand for dairy and meat and more luxury and quality food products which Europe has traditionally been very well positioned to provide.
Four, the Common Agricultural Policy over decades has reformed Europe’s agricultural markets and made its farmers in many sectors (not all – there remain pockets of poverty) more internationally competitive, aligning European with world market prices. This has been particularly true for cereals, dairy, meats, and fruits and vegetables.
And five, trade policy and the EU’s growing network of Free Trade Agreements (currently 39 agreements covering 89 countries) has kept Europe’s export markets largely open, reduced obstacles to market access, especially SPS-based restrictions imposed by third countries, and created new markets.
Post 2027 European Agricultural Policy and Its impact on trade
Will these drivers of past performance continue to play a role? Will they remain the drivers of the EU’s future agrifood trade? The answer has to be heavily nuanced. The demographic trends mentioned above (population growth outside the EU, and growing urbanisation especially in emerging economies and Sub Saharan Africa) are likely to continue, as is expanding middle class consumer taste for quality, safe European food. That shows no signs of abating.
The agro-environmental and climate conditions in the next decade are however unlikely to be favourable to European agricultural production. Extreme weather events, driven by climate change, have already had detrimental impacts on European farming, especially for arable and permanent crops and fruit. There is no sign that this will improve as Europe’s climate is determined from outside the EU by other regions’ GHG emissions, and as the EU’s own net zero climate target recedes further and further from view. Europe is the fastest warming continent.
Climate change-induced invasions of new and exotic pests and diseases attacking crops and livestock alike are likely to continue, and European producers increasingly lack the tools (pesticides, herbicides etc) to counter them due to increasingly restrictive European regulations. And Europe’s air, water and soil quality and biodiversity are in retreat. Rising energy and other input costs are also predicted to hamper Europe’s future farm production and levels of productivity.
The next Common Agricultural Policy will also probably result in a slowing down of Europe’s agricultural production and productivity. The budget – now being negotiated between the EU Member States and the European Parliament will be smaller in real terms than the current one: a reduction in support of possibly up to 20%. Furthermore, the next EU Multinannual Financial Framework (2027-2034) within which the CAP budget sits has been redesigned to establish within it a common budget line for a range of national-level development actions, of which the traditional CAP “second pillar” of rural development is now but one. This means that money previously earmarked exclusively for rural development can in theory now be re-directed to other national priorities such as defence, digitalisation or even culture, at the choice of each Member State. Depending on each Member State’s decision, this may potentially lead to reductions in rural development spending which will make some agricultural areas less economically viable. Independent commentators however consider that farmers’ fears about a wholesale switch of funds away from rural development are exaggerated, and they do not expect dramatic changes to rural development spending as a result of this new budgetary instrument.
The next CAP will see a continued emphasis on environmental conditionalities, with farmers required to continue applying a somewhat burdensome range of environment and climate related regulations, notwithstanding the recent decisions of the EU to simplify the regulatory framework for farms, introduce more flexibility into “Green Deal” requirements, and to postpone certain planned sustainability regulations.
Against this background one can expect a growing frustration amongst European farm groups about the competitive advantage enjoyed by imports produced to less exacting standards than those imposed upon EU farmers, and without this regulatory and bureaucratic burden. The European Commission has already promised more systematic border checks on SPS grounds to protect human, animal and plant health and safety, a régime which will tend to favour large multinational exporters to the EU as they have more resources to meet EU standards, and hamper access of small and medium sized producers and enterprises.
The Commission has also promised, as a means to “level the playing field” for EU farmers facing cheaper competition from imports, to tighten its regulations in respect of pesticide Maximum Residue Limits (MRLs), reducing some to zero where the relevant active substance is banned in the EU. If this largely protectionist measure is pursued, this will have a serious detrimental impact on imported products produced using these pesticides. The fruit and vegetable sector will be particularly affected.
Alongside the CAP itself the EU will in the coming five years develop its nascent food security policy, having recognised, belatedly, the importance of food and farming to economic and broader European security, and the risk that food supplies can be weaponised.
This is likely to be reflected in measures to improve levels of self sufficiency in protein, to diversify sources of supplies of essential inputs (fertilisers, pesticides, energy, soya..), to improve monitoring mechanisms at national level to anticipate shocks to the food supply or supply chains, and to take more serious efforts to reduce food waste at retail and household levels. Strategic stockpiling of commodities is being seriously discussed for the first time in decades but given the cost and inefficiency of stockpiling it is unlikely to materialise. Against this backdrop, Morocco can position itself as a reliable supplier of a range of agricultural goods that form part of Europe’s diverse food security strategy.
Finally, the Black Swan in all this is Ukraine. It is of course impossible to know when and how rapidly Ukraine will join the EU and become a participant in the Common Agricultural Policy, but Ukrainian accession will trigger important changes in European farming, and the budget devoted to it, given the sheer size and efficiency of parts of Ukrainian farming across most sectors. Unless Ukraine’s integration into the CAP is done very gradually, and unless financial support is available to EU farmers affected by Ukrainian competition inside the single market, accession will impact very negatively on European farm incomes ranging from cereals to fruits and vegetables to poultry, beef and other animal products
Whither Trade Policy?
Trade Policy in the next Decade is likely to be on balance less favourable to the agriculture sector, including imports into the EU. On the positive side, the EU will complete its twenty year programme of FTA negotiations by 2030, with the result that by that date about 2/3 of the EU’s trade will be preferential, and only the three major markets of the USA, China and Russia will lie outside the EU’s network of FTAs. The emphasis from now on will be on implementation of these Agreements to maximise their benefits.
On the negative side it is reasonable to assume that international trade will continue to be dominated by geopolitical rivalries, led by the US and China, high and unstable tariffs imposed by the US on its trading partners, and an increasing “weaponisation” of trade for political ends. There are no winners from trade wars, which if they happen will dampen economic growth in major markets. The EU will therefore pursue a policy of “strategic autonomy” in trade policy, aiming to secure supply chains and avoid dangerous dependencies on a single country or supplier, including through the FTAs diversification of markets and sources of supply.
With the FTA programme reaching completion, the EU is turning its attention now to other forms of sectoral trade agreement such as mutual recognition of conformity assessment, SPS equivalence agreements, trade facilitation and customs cooperation agreements, clean trade and investment partnerships (of which several have been concluded with African countries), agreements to secure critical raw materials, or digital trade agreements. Morocco can be a beneficiary of this new policy shift.
Finally, the EU’s climate and sustainability agenda over the next decade will have direct and indirect trade impacts, not least on imports. CBAM, the Deforestation Regulation (DR), the Regulation prohibiting the marketing of goods produced using forced labour, and the Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive (CS3D) all have an extra-territorial dimension affecting imports. Not only domestic production, but third country agricultural products coming to the EU market will have to demonstrate compliance with the suite of standards and requirements imposed by these important pieces of legislation.
To this can be added the tighter rules on pesticide use mentioned earlier (MRLs), higher animal welfare standards expected to be introduced in the next three years, especially a ban on caging in livestock production, which are almost certainly to be applied to imported products, a possible sustainability labelling scheme, and more stringent rules on packaging and packaging waste. The regulatory landscape for third country exporters to Europe is therefore going to be very challenging.
What Does This All Mean For Morocco?
The future agritrade landscape carries important implications – some positive, some negative - for Morocco’s trade with the EU.
First, demand for Moroccan produce is unlikely to diminish, as European production will be less and less able to satisfy consumption demands in the EU and Morocco’s proximity to the EU and established commercial channels give it a competitive advantage over most other third country suppliers.
Two, there will be a continued trend towards consumption of fruit and vegetables and the Mediterranean diet, as part of a European policy to nudge the public to have better health and, through substituting meat by plant based proteins, use limited land more efficiently.
Three, the Global Gateway of EU large scale investment in African infrastructure (energy, digital, roads and rail and ports) will benefit Morocco in terms of its development as a key logistical and production hub between Europe and Africa.
Four, protectionism amongst European farmers and a drive to reduce imports, as well as attempts to increase slightly domestic self-sufficiency, may result in periodic disruptions of the market for Moroccan exporters.
And five, the tougher environmental, climate, animal welfare, pesticide and human rights requirements applied to imports could have a serious detrimental impact on Morocco if its producers cannot meet these ever more stringent (and frequently changing) rules.
What Should Morocco Do, Going Forward? A Seven Point Plan
At last month’s Morocco Tomato Conference this writer explained the expected regulatory and trade landscape set out now in this article. I ended by making seven recommendations to Moroccan authorities and producers.
First, Morocco must make major efforts to ensure that its production methods (pesticide use, animal welfare standards, water usage, climate footprint etc) fully meet EU standards, thus offering no pretext for European regulators to restrict imports. Morocco must position itself as a reliable partner in terms of compliance.
Two, Morocco – both the government and its farm federations – must join forces with other countries in demanding the carrying out of ex ante Impact Assessments before any proposed MRL decision, and as part of such IA assess the impact on developing country farmers supplying the EU market. Morocco and others must also insist that any MRL decisions should be evidence and science based (to avoid the risk of the European Parliament adopting new MRLs for political or protectionist reasons), and be done on a case by case basis - by individual product and plant protection product.
Three, in the FAO, WTO, WHO, African Union and other multilateral fora Morocco should join the call to exempt food from any future tariff and trade wars or retaliatory trade measures, on food security grounds. Food is too important to be taken hostage by unrelated trade disputes.
Four, Morocco should propose to the EU to ratify the completed but suspended EU-Morocco Agreement on Protection of Geographical Indications. With solutions having been found to the labelling of products coming from the region Western Sahara, this removes the main obstacle to ratifying this GI Agreement which will be of benefit equally to Moroccan and European quality produce. It will also increase Europe’s political stake in maintaining good relations with Morocco in the trade sphere.
Five, Moroccan producers need to be constantly ahead of the curve in introducing the most innovative production practices – for example smart greenhouses equipped for minimising water and input use and reducing labour costs, the development of new varieties of fruits and vegetables to both meet - and anticipate - rapidly changing consumer patterns in the EU (which differ between Member States), and minimising environmental impact. Through such means Morocco can retain its current competitive edge.
Six, the Moroccan government and financial institutions should redouble their efforts to encourage European investment into the Moroccan agricultural sector, positioning Morocco as a reliable indeed strategic partner for Europe straddling food, energy and infrastructure and linking Europe to the wider African and MENA market. Global Gateway will be an important framework for investment flows into the region.
And finally, given the political uncertainties facing both Europe and Morocco, Morocco should follow the example of other countries and try to diversify its markets to avoid being wholly reliant on Europe. It must also forge ahead with strategies to reduce input use – moving to more green energy, desalinisation etc – to increase its resilience on the supply side of the equation. The Moroccan government is well aware of these imperatives and is already acting.